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Abstract
This article compares the effectiveness and the fairness of four alternative policies
aimed at managing multilingual communication in the European Union. The current
multilingual regime, based on the formal equality among the official languages of the
European Union Member States disenfranchises only a small percentage of residents.
On the contrary, an English-only language policy would exclude 45% to 79% of adult
residents in the 25 countries for which data are available, depending on the indicator
used. A language regime based on English, French and German would disenfranchise
26% to 49% of residents, whereas a regime based on six languages would bring the
shares of the excluded population down to 9–18%. In addition, results show that eco-
nomically and socially disadvantaged individuals are less likely to speak languages other
than their own native tongue, and therefore they are much more likely to be adversely
affected if the European Union stops using their language. The current full multilingual
policy of the European Union based on translation and interpreting not only is (and will
be for the foreseeable future) the most effective language policy among the alternatives
examined; it is also the only one that is truly inclusive at a relatively reasonable cost. The
British withdrawal from the European Union is likely to increase rather than decrease
the importance of a multilingual language policy.
Keywords
European Union, language policy, linguistic justice, multilingualism, translation costs
Corresponding author:
Michele Gazzola, Department of Education Studies, Research Group Economics and Language (REAL),
Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin, Germany, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany.
Email: gazzola@hu-berlin.de
 at Committee of the Regions on October 27, 2016eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Introduction
Thedecisionmadeby theEuropeanUnion (EU)at its inception togiveoﬃcial status to
all oﬃcial languages of its Member States1 has led to an intensive debate on its costs,
advantages and disadvantages. In recent years, the language regimeof theEUhas been
overtly criticised for being too costly and cumbersome. According to some authors,
using only one language would contribute to the eﬀectiveness of the communication of
the EU, and it could eventually encourage the cohesion of the EU as a whole. Usually
the candidate language is English (e.g. Archibugi, 2005; Cogo and Jenkins, 2010; De
Swaan, 2001; Rose, 2008; Van Parijs, 2011), and occasionally Esperanto (e.g.
Christiansen, 2006; Gobbo, 2005; Selten and Frank, 2005). Other authors propose
intermediate solutions based on a restricted number of oﬃcial languages, for example,
six – i.e. English, French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish (Fidrmuc et al., 2010) –
or three – i.e. English, French and German (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005).
In practice, EU institutions adopt a variety of de facto language regimes. The
European Commission, for example, enforces a trilingual language regime in some
circumstances and for certain purposes. It has argued in favour of a trilingual
regime based on English, French and German for an open competition for the
recruitment of administrators and assistants (see Case C-566/10 P – Italy vs.
Commission, 21 June 2012, lost by the Commission; Case T-124/13, Italy vs.
Commission and Case T-191/13 Spain vs. Commission, 24 September 2015, lost
by the Commission). The Commission has also defended a trilingual language
regime based on English, French and Spanish for a call for proposals (see
Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 259/2005(PB)GG against
the European Commission, 30 April 2008, lost by the Commission).
There are diﬀerent practical arrangements as regards the languages used to pub-
lish non-legally binding documents such as the Internet webpages of the
Commission’s Directorates-General (DGs), calls for tender, and the guidelines of
various EU funding programmes. In 2014, for example, 14 DGs out of 33 published
their home pages in English only, eight DGs in English, French and German,
one DG in 11 languages, and 10 DGs in 24 or 23 oﬃcial languages (Gazzola,
2014: 249–250). Disparities in the access to information resulting from an unequal
treatment of the oﬃcial languages in the Commission’s website have been occasion-
ally the object of written questions lodged by the Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) (see, for example, the Written question E-011475/11 by Ms
Nathalie Griesbeck: ‘Multilingualism and the Commission’s Internet sites’). MEPs’
concerns about an unequal treatment of the oﬃcial languages go beyond parochial
nationalism. Besides being a repository of news or general information about the
Commission’s activities, the DGs’ webpages also contain material that can have a
strategic importance for economic actors such as small and medium enterprises,
associations and NGOs that compete for calls for tenders, funding programmes or
procurement procedures. In January 2014, for example, the Commission published
in English only the guidelines of the EU funding programme Erasmus+ (2014–
2020), a programme with a budget of almost E15 billion that provides grants for
a wide range of actions and activities in the ﬁelds of education, training, youth and
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sport. Translations into the other oﬃcial languages were provided after April,
whereas the ﬁrst deadline to submit project proposals was in March. According to
some MEPs, belated translations of the guidelines entailed an unfair competitive
advantage in favour of English-speaking citizens, associations and NGOs (see
Written question E-000507/14 lodged by Mr Giancarlo Scotta` and Mr Lorenzo
Fontana to the Commission: ‘Failure to translate the Erasmus+ programme’).
It is necessary, therefore, to evaluate what are the distributive eﬀects of the use of
a limited number of oﬃcial languages today, and what could be the outcome of a
drastic reduction in the number of EU oﬃcial languages in the foreseeable future.
Interdisciplinary research in language policy and planning (LPP) has shown that
language policies can be viewed and analysed as a form of public policy (Grin,
2003). Therefore, they can be compared and evaluated on the basis of standard
criteria such as eﬀectiveness and fairness. It is necessary to clarify that, in policy
evaluation, assessing the fairness of alternative policies (or scenarios) implies iden-
tifying, under each scenario, who loses, who gains, and (if possible) to what extent.
Thus, there is no primarily moral or ethical content in the technical concept of
fairness in policy analysis (Just et al., 2004). Obviously, the empirical assessment
of such distributive eﬀects provides a basis for normative statements on alterna-
tive policies, but such ethical statements will not be addressed here (for a discussion
of fairness in LPP, or ‘linguistic justice’, from the point of view of political philoso-
phy, see De Schutter, 2007; De Schutter and Robichaud, 2015; Peled et al., 2014).
Although the academic debate on the EU language regime is characterised by a
relatively high diversity of approaches,2 little empirical research has been carried out
so far on the comparative evaluation of the distributive eﬀects of a change of the EU
language regime or of a reduction of the domains of use of the current oﬃcial lan-
guages. Existing quantitative studies in this area tend to focus on the analysis of
eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency (Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh, 2007; Gazzola, 2006;
Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005), and usually they do not explicitly address the question
of fairness. This is somewhat surprising, as equity (together with eﬃciency) is a central
criterion in the evaluation of language policies. In the few empirical studies discussing
the distributive eﬀects of a more or less multilingual EU language regime the number
of the alternative scenarios compared is limited to two or three. For example, Gazzola
and Grin (2013), using data from the Eurobarometer survey published in 2012, com-
pute the percentage of residents who do not speak English by country. Using a similar
empirical strategy and data from the ﬁrst wave of the Adult Education Survey (AES-
2007) in 24 EU Member States, Gazzola (2014) compares a multilingual language
regime with two alternative policies, i.e. a trilingual language policy based on English,
French and German, and an English-only language regime. Both studies point out
large and signiﬁcant diﬀerences among European countries regarding the percentage
of citizens that would be excluded from communication with the EU if the number of
oﬃcial languages were reduced. I report in the next sections some results of the studies
mentioned, and I compare them with the results of this article.
This article expands research on the quantitative evaluation of the fairness of the
language policy of the EU. It shows that economically and socially disadvantaged
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individuals tend to be less likely to speak languages other than their own native
tongue, and therefore, they are more likely to be adversely aﬀected if the EU stops
using their language. The current full multilingual policy of the EU based on transla-
tion and interpreting is not only (and will be for the foreseeable future) the most
eﬀective language policy among the alternative options usually put forward in the
literature; it is also the only one that is truly inclusive at a relatively reasonable cost.
Indicators and dataset
A language regime is the language policy of an organisation. It is deﬁned as a set of
oﬃcial and working languages along with rules concerning their use for the com-
munication within and outside the organisation, and the extent of translation and
interpreting to be provided in such languages. This article focuses on the part of the
EU language regime that concerns external communication, although the borders
between internal and external communication are often blurred.
A distinction must be made between the inputs, the outputs and the outcomes of
a language regime. The inputs are deﬁned as human, regulatory and material
means used to implement a policy (e.g. the costs of language services such as
translation and interpreting). The outputs of a language regime are what have
been directly produced through the resources employed, typically the number of
pages of translated documents or the amount of hours of interpreting per year. The
outcome is the eﬀect of the policy on the target population. In this study, the target
population consists of people resident in the EU.
The evaluation of the eﬀectiveness and the fairness of a language regime must be
carried out on the basis of outcomes. The outcome indicator used in this study is
the ‘linguistic disenfranchisement rate’, an indicator introduced by Ginsburgh and
Weber (2005). It is deﬁned as the percentage of citizens who potentially cannot
understand EU documents such as regulations and calls for tenders, or oral public
discussions such as the plenary meetings of the European Parliament transmitted
through the Internet, because they do not master any oﬃcial language. The lower
the disenfranchisement rate, the higher the eﬀectiveness of a language regime. The
relationship between output and outcome is straightforward, as the value of the
disenfranchisement rate depends on the extent of translation and interpreting.
The linguistic disenfranchisement rate is a relevant indicator in evaluating the EU
language regime because it can be directly linked to some of the main objectives of the
EU, that is, facilitating the democratic participation of European citizens in EU aﬀairs
and informing residents and taxpayers about EU business. The policy-relevance of this
indicator can be deduced from the results of the Eurobarometer survey on languages in
Europe, according to which 60% of Europeans believe that the translation from, and
into, foreign languages plays a very, or fairly important, role in enabling participation in
EU activities or getting information about them (European Commission, 2012a: 140).
This article employs data from the second wave of the Adult Education Survey
(AES-2011). Data were collected by Eurostat in 2011 and published at the end of 2013.
25 European countries are considered. Croatia did not participate in the survey.
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Romania and the Netherlands have been excluded because of excessive missing infor-
mation in the dataset.3 The sample used consists of 169,481 statistical observations;
93% of respondents are citizens of the EU living in their home country – or ‘national’
using the terminology of the AES –, 2.6% are EU citizens living in another EU
Member State, 4.3% are non-EU citizens. The percentages of nationals, EU citizens
abroad and non-EU citizens in the UK had to be extrapolated from the AES-2007
because information on citizenship in this country is missing in the AES-2011. As a
result of the referendum held on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom has decided to
leave the EU. At the time of writing of this article, the negotiations to formalise the
British withdrawal from the EU (‘Brexit’) have not started yet, and the process could
last up to two years. Hence, it is not possible to predict what the EU is going to look
like after ‘Brexit’. As a result, any attempt to describe the future language regime of the
EU without the UK is necessarily premature. Nevertheless, I discuss in the conclusions
some possible consequences of Brexit on the language policy of the EU.
In this article, I focus on the residents in the EU rather than EU citizens because
European legal provisions and the decisions taken by the European Parliament
apply to every person residing in the Union. Nevertheless, results do not change
substantially if only EU citizens are considered. All deﬁnitions apply to European
residents aged 25–64 living in private households.
Besides demographic and socio-economic information on the respondents, the
AES contains information on residents’ native language(s) and on their knowledge
of up to seven foreign languages. Data on languages were collected with respect to
49 languages, and skills in foreign languages were self-assessed by interviewees on a
formally deﬁned three-level scale of competence, that is:
. fair (I can understand and use the most common everyday expressions. I use the
language in relation to familiar things and situations);
. good (I can understand the essentials of clear language and produce simple texts.
I can describe experiences and events and communicate fairly ﬂuently);
. proﬁcient (I can understand a wide range of demanding texts and use the lan-
guage ﬂexibly. I master the language almost completely).
The AES, at least as regards the residents in the EU aged 25–64, is richer than the
three Eurobarometer surveys on the linguistic skills of European citizens published in
2001, 2006 and 2012 that are often mentioned in the literature. The AES includes
more variables and more observations. In addition, data on language proﬁciency are
more reliable. Research in language testing has compared the results of self-assess-
ments with teachers’ grades or test scores. Results are mixed (for an overview see
Luoma, 2013). Nevertheless, the research points to a generally valid conclusion: self-
assessments are more accurate (using teacher’s evaluation as a term of comparison) if
learners ‘respond to ‘‘can do’’ statements that deﬁne concrete language use experi-
ences that are familiar to the learners than if they are asked to use a proﬁciency scale
with more abstract deﬁnitions of language skills’ (Ross, 1998, quoted in Luoma,
2013: 4). It is not possible to assess the accuracy of data on language skills contained
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in the AES, because they are not based on objective tests. Nevertheless, one can
safely assume that they are more accurate than those contained in the
Eurobarometer. The AES uses explicit descriptors of language proﬁciency based
on ‘can do’ scales, whereas the questionnaire of the Eurobarometer survey contains
three levels of competence – that is, ‘basic’, ‘good’ and ‘very good’ – that are not
formally deﬁned (except for the 2001 survey). This leaves to the respondents the
subjective responsibility of interpreting what such levels mean. The AES’s scale
facilitates the comparison with the descriptors of the Common European
Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR), which has become the standard
framework for the evaluation of language skills in Europe.
A distinction must be made between the absolute disenfranchisement rate (Da)
on one hand, and the relative disenfranchisement rate (Dr) on the other hand. The
ﬁrst indicator is deﬁned as the percentage of citizens who are linguistically disen-
franchised because they have no knowledge of any of the oﬃcial languages deter-
mined by a given language regime. This is the indicator originally proposed by
Ginsburgh and Weber (2005), and it is deﬁned as follows:
D ¼ 1 Sb ð1Þ
where Sb is the percentage of residents who have at least some knowledge of at least
one oﬃcial language (native speakers, therefore, are included). This indicator provides
a ﬁrst idea of the distribution of language skills among Europeans. Yet, it is risky to
put native speakers of a language on the same level as those who declare to have just a
basic or intermediate level of competence of the said language. It is reasonable to
assume that very good language skills are necessary to understand without too much
eﬀort legal texts, calls for tenders, webpages presenting health notices about food,
discourses of a political or technical nature such as those produced by various bodies
of the EU, or to lodge a complaint to the European Ombudsman. The relative dis-
enfranchisement rate (Dr) captures precisely this idea. Dr is deﬁned as follows:
Dr ¼ 1 NSþNNSp
  ð2Þ
where NS stands for the percentage of native speakers of the oﬃcial languages, and
NNSp stands for the percentage of non-native speakers who, according to the AES
self-evaluation scale, declare a proﬁcient level of knowledge of at least one oﬃcial
language as a ﬁrst or second foreign language.4 A ‘good’ level of language know-
ledge is not likely to be enough to communicate with EU institutions without too
much eﬀort, and certainly not at the same level of conﬁdence of native speakers of
the oﬃcial language or people who are proﬁcient in it. In this article, both disen-
franchisement rates are used because they denote a lower and an upper bound.
Linguistic disenfranchisement in the EU
Four language regimes are compared. The ﬁrst one corresponds to the status quo,
that is, a multilingual language policy based on 22 oﬃcial languages (Croatian and
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Romanian are excluded from the analysis because Croatia and Romania are not
included in the set of countries examined). On the basis of the alternative scenarios
most frequently discussed in the literature, three counterfactuals are identiﬁed,
that is:
. a hexalingual language regime including six languages, namely, English, French,
German, Italian, Polish and Spanish. In terms of native speakers, these lan-
guages are the largest EU oﬃcial languages;
. a trilingual language regime based on English, French and German;
. a monolingual (or English-only) language policy.
The results are presented in the last row of Table 1, and they are consistent with
those reported in other studies that use diﬀerent datasets. Table 1 shows net values,
that is, there is no double counting. For example, someone knowing both French
and English is taken into account only once when computing the disenfranchise-
ment rate corresponding to a trilingual language regime. The AES-2011 does not
contain data on the language attributes and the language skills of residents in
Table 1. Absolute and relative disenfranchisement rates in the EU, by study.
Monolingual Trilingual Hexalingual Multilingual
Language regime Da Dint
b Dr Da Dint
b Dr Da Dint
b Dr Da Dr
Ginsburg and Weber (2005) –
Eurobarometer 2001, EU-15
45 – – 19 – – 4a – – – –
Firdmuc et al. (2010) –
Eurobarometer 2006, EU-27
– 62.6 – – 37.8 – – 16.4 – – –
Gazzola and Grin (2013) –
Eurobarometer 2012, EU-27
50 62 79 – – – – – – 0 –
Gazzola (2014) –
AES 2007, EU-24
49 – 81 28 – 55 12 – 26 0 4
This study –
AES 2011, EU-25
45 65 79 26 39 49 8 14 19 0 4
aThe sixth language being Dutch instead of Polish;
bTo facilitate comparison with Fidrmuc et al. (2010) and Gazzola and Grin (2013), I compute and report the
value of a third indicator of linguistic disenfranchisement. I have named it ‘intermediate disenfranchisement
rate’ (Dint). This indicator is defined as follows:
Dint ¼ 1 NSþ NNSp þ NNSg
  ð3Þ
where NNSg is the percentage of non-native speakers of the official languages declaring a ‘good’ level of
knowledge of at least one official language as a first or second foreign language. This indicator, nevertheless, is
not used in this article.
Data are reported in percentages.
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the UK. Moreover, 5.3% of residents in Ireland declare to have no native language.
This may be due to some errors in data collection or to a negative attitude of some
Irish native speakers of English towards this language (on this point see Mac Gre´il
and Rhatigan, 2009).
In order to avoid the exclusion of these two countries, I assume that all residents
in the UK and Ireland are either native speakers of English or proﬁcient in English
as a foreign language according to the deﬁnition provided above. As a result of this
choice and of the omission of three non-English speaking countries (Croatia,
Holland and Romania), in this study, the percentage of people knowing English
in Europe is slightly overestimated.
Table 1 shows that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between absolute and relative
disenfranchisement rates. This implies that, on average, residents in the 25 coun-
tries examined do not have high skills in foreign languages. For example, 55% of
residents in the sample declare themselves as having at least a fair knowledge of
English, including native speakers. Yet, the percentage of residents who declare to
be native speakers of English or proﬁcient non-natives is much lower (13% and 8%
of the sample, respectively). Data reveal that knowledge of English is still not a
‘basic skill’ or a universal lingua franca in Europe yet. In 25 countries considered,
between 45% and 79% of the population either do speak it or know it to a level
that is not likely to be high enough to take part in EU business without excessive
eﬀort.
The hexalingual and trilingual language regimes would generate positive and
considerable disenfranchisement rates. As a result, the current multilingual lan-
guage regime is the most eﬀective language policy among the four alternatives
examined. The positive value of the relative disenfranchisement rate associated
with the multilingual policy (4%) is due to the presence of diﬀerent minorities in
some Member States, notably, the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic coun-
tries, and the Arabic-, Serbo/Croatian- or Turkish-speaking residents with limited
proﬁciency in the oﬃcial language of the country of residence. A positive, although
rather low, Dr associated with the status quo means that the relative disenfranchise-
ment rate resulting from the three alternative language regimes must be read in
additional terms. For example, as 4% of residents in the 25 states considered are
(relatively) linguistically disenfranchised anyway, the additional (or marginal) Dr
associated with the monolingual language regime is equal to 75%.
The disenfranchisement rates signiﬁcantly vary across countries, as shown in
Table 2.
The Da resulting from a monolingual language regime is higher than 50% in 12
countries out of 25, and the Dr is at least 90% in 11 countries. Adding French and
German to English reduces both Da and Dr in Southern and Eastern countries,
respectively, but not signiﬁcantly in the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, a trilingual
language regime would still disenfranchise more than one-third of residents in 12
countries out of 25. Dr is higher than 90% in nine countries. The relative disen-
franchisement rate is positive and above 5% in Austria, Germany and France, even
when German and French are included amid the set of oﬃcial languages. This is
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due to the presence of citizens with a foreign background and immigrants from
other EU countries with limited knowledge of English, French or German. This
proportion could rise as a result of an increasing mobility in Europe and of recent
massive migration ﬂows from the Middle East and Africa.
Adding Italian, Polish and Spanish drastically reduces Da in Italy, Poland,
Spain, and to a much lesser extent in Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia. The full
Table 2. Absolute and relative disenfranchisement rates, by country.
Monolingual Trilingual Hexalingual Multilingual
Language regime Da Dr Da Dr Da Dr Da Dr
Austria 33 82 0 7 0 6 0 6
Belgium 51 87 22 47 21 46 1 4
Bulgaria 77 95 72 94 71 94 8 8
Cyprus 20 65 20 64 20 64 0 11
Czech Rep. 64 92 46 90 45 90 0 1
Denmark 9 66 8 64 8 63 0 3
Estonia 42 88 36 87 36 87 10 26
Finland 11 74 10 73 10 73 0 2
France 52 93 1 5 1 5 1 4
Germany 34 89 0 6 0 5 0 5
Greece 48 89 46 88 46 88 1 6
Hungary 76 94 66 92 66 92 0 0
Ireland§ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 55 95 43 92 0 3 0 3
Latvia 51 92 41 91 40 91 3 36
Lithuania 63 93 52 92 41 85 0 9
Luxembourg 14 84 2 11 2 10 2 9
Malta 11 50 11 49 10 48 0 0
Poland 68 95 57 93 0 0 0 0
Portugal 57 90 47 86 42 84 0 1
Slovenia 36 81 23 77 21 74 1 10
Slovakia 66 95 49 92 48 92 0 0
Spain 69 94 62 91 0 6 0 6
Sweden 12 62 12 61 11 60 1 8
United Kingdom§ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eurostat, 2013, AES.
Data (EU-25) are reported in percentages.
§In order to overcome a lack of adequate data for Ireland and the UK, I make the hypothesis that all residents
in these two countries are either native speakers of English or proficient in English as a foreign language. For
this reason, the disenfranchisement rate is equal to zero.
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multilingual language regime, on the contrary, does not create high absolute dis-
enfranchisement rates within European countries, with the exception of Estonia
and partially Latvia. Results for Bulgaria must be interpreted with caution.5 The
relative disenfranchisement rate associated with a full multilingual regime is rather
high in Cyprus, Luxembourg, Sweden or Slovenia, mainly as a result of immigrants
or minorities without a very good knowledge of the local oﬃcial language. This
raises diﬀerent interesting questions on the need for a language policy for new
minorities issued from migration. For reasons of space, nevertheless, such ques-
tions cannot be addressed here.
In conclusion, the current multilingual policy of the EU is not in the absolute the
most eﬀective way to inform Europeans about the EU; in certain countries, add-
itional languages may be useful to minimise linguistic exclusion. Nevertheless, it is
certainly the most eﬀective scenario among the four alternative policies compared
in this study.
Linguistic disenfranchisement by social group
It is quite logical that a monolingual or a trilingual language regime would disad-
vantage the citizens of some Member States more than others. It is less obvious,
nevertheless, which social groups within Member States suﬀer more from a reduc-
tion in the number of oﬃcial languages and, most importantly, by how much. This
is a crucial piece of information in ex ante policy evaluation. Generally speaking, a
careful comparison of the likely impacts of alternative policy options should be
carried out in order to make informed decisions about which policy is best suited to
achieve some relevant policy goals. Surprisingly, with few exceptions, the majority
of the authors who recommend a decrease in the number of oﬃcial languages of the
EU provide no empirical analysis of the expected outcomes of this choice.
The AES allows us to characterise respondents according to some relevant
socio-economic dimensions, that is, age, income status, educational level achieved
and occupational status. Obviously, there are other socio-economic variables that
would be worth considering, but the AES provides information only on the socio-
economic variables just mentioned. Consequently, I use the said variables to build
four macro social groups, and I examine the variation of the disenfranchisement
rate within each group. The notion of ‘social group’, therefore, is employed in a
broad sense in order to include individuals with similar socio-economic
characteristics.
Table 3 shows the distribution of Da and Dr by age group. It puts the results of
Table 1 into perspective by introducing a time variable, because studying the
change in the disenfranchisement rates across generations provides a ﬁrst idea of
the likely evolution of linguistic exclusion in the future.
The results show a clear relationship between the absolute disenfranchisement
rate and age: younger generations tend to speak foreign languages more often
than older ones, and, therefore, the Da is lower among the younger respondents.
For example, the absolute disenfranchisement rate resulting from an English-only
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language regime is equal to 59% among residents aged 55–64, and 30% among
those aged 25–34 (recall that native speakers of English are included). The same
trend can be observed for all three language regimes alternative to the status quo.
Surprisingly, the Dr does not vary too much across generations. The diﬀerence
between the relative disenfranchisement rate resulting from monolingualism among
residents aged 55–64 and the corresponding rate among those aged 25–34 amounts
to just 9%; this gap is much lower than the diﬀerence measured through Da (i.e.
29%). Dr is virtually constant across age groups in the trilingual and hexolingual
scenarios. As regards the multilingual language regime, Dr is slightly higher among
the younger respondents, probably as a result of migration ﬂows.
The results show that, on average, young people are more likely to have
acquired at least some knowledge of foreign languages than the older generation,
as shown by the diﬀerence in Da across cohorts. Nevertheless, they have not learnt
them much better, as revealed by the relatively little intergenerational variance of
Dr. This observation is relevant for decision-makers, because it points out that the
need for translation and interpreting in the EU is not likely to change drastically in
the foreseeable future.
Income is another important variable that must be considered. In the AES
respondents’ income is deﬁned in relative terms using statistical deciles, which
makes it possible to compare, at least to a certain extent, the income status of
residents across diﬀerent countries. The variable income in the AES is deﬁned as
the share of net monthly income of the household accruing to respondents. Due to
some incongruences in data collection,6 it is not possible to provide a contingency
table in which the relationship between the disenfranchisement rates and income
status is examined for the EU as a whole. Nevertheless, it is possible to carry out a
reliable empirical analysis at the individual country level for a subset of Member
States.
Table 3. Absolute and relative disenfranchisement rates, by age group.
Age group 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64
Language regime
Monolingual Da 30 41 49 59
Dr 74 77 82 83
Trilingual Da 17 24 28 34
Dr 48 49 49 51
Hexalingual Da 5 7 9 12
Dr 19 19 19 21
Multilingual Da 0 0 1 0
Dr 4 4 3 2
Eurostat, 2013, AES.
Data (EU-25) are reported in percentages.
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I estimate the strength of the statistical correlation between the ordinal variable
‘income status’ and the dichotomous variable ‘knowledge of at least one oﬃcial
language as a foreign language’ in 12 countries. The correlation is measured
through the Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient ().7 A positive correlation
between the two variables means that people belonging to the highest deciles of
the income distribution are more likely to have at least some knowledge of at least
one oﬃcial language as a foreign language, and, therefore, they are less likely to be
disenfranchised if their mother tongue is not used for oﬃcial purposes. In order to
avoid spurious correlations, native speakers of the oﬃcial language(s) must be
excluded.
In Table 4, countries have been clustered in four groups reﬂecting the strength of
the statistical correlation between the two variables considered. These groups are
deﬁned by the range of the value of ; the higher the value of , the stronger the
correlation.
The Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant in all 12 countries. The estimates reveal a correlation between the level of
respondents’ income and their language skills. In other words, the higher the
income status, the lower the absolute disenfranchisement rate. For reasons of
space, I cannot discuss in detail the relationship between income status and Dr.
Suﬃce it to say that the value of  is still positive but lower than the value of  in
Table 4.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences among Member States. In Hungary or Portugal,
the relationship between income and Da is stronger than in Denmark or Italy. This
can be due to the fact that in the latter two countries, no matter what the level of
income of respondents is, some knowledge of foreign languages is quite widespread
among the population (e.g. in Denmark), or, alternatively, it is not widespread
among residents (e.g. in Italy). Further, Table 4 shows that the correlation between
income status and the disenfranchisement rate is independent of the language
Table 4. Correlation between income status (in deciles) and the knowledge of at least one
official language, selected EU countries.
Spearman’s
rank correlation
coefficient
Language regime
Monolingual Trilingual Hexalingual
0.30–0.40< Estonia, Hungary, Portugal Hungary, Portugal Hungary, Portugal
0.20–0.30< Slovakia, Latvia, Spain Estonia, Latvia,
Slovakia, Spain,
Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia,
0.10–0.20< Austria, Finland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta
Finland, Italy, Malta Finland, Malta
0–0.10< Denmark Denmark Denmark
Eurostat, 2013, AES.
The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is always statistically significant at the 1% level.
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regime chosen. Putting it diﬀerently, any alternative to the status quo would dis-
enfranchise residents with a relatively lower income more often than residents who
have a relatively higher income. By contrast, the current language regime does not
entail signiﬁcant income-related inequalities among European residents, because
the oﬃcial languages used correspond, with some exceptions, to their mother
tongue or primary language of education.
Disenfranchisement rates, as expected, are correlated with education. Table 5
presents the distribution of Da and Dr according to the highest level of education
successfully completed by respondents.8 The levels of education are deﬁned follow-
ing the ISCED classiﬁcation (ISCED stands for ‘International Standard
Classiﬁcation of Education’, a system developed by UNESCO to facilitate the
comparison between the educational systems of diﬀerent countries).
Table 5 reveals a clear relationship between, on the one hand, the value of Da
and Dr associated with the three language regimes alternative to the status quo, and
the respondents’ level of education on the other hand. A trilingual language regime,
for example, would disenfranchise one-fourth of all residents who have successfully
completed an upper secondary level of education, but only 8% of those who have
achieved a tertiary level of education (recall that Table 5 presents percentages based
on the whole population; thus, native speakers are included). Nevertheless, the
relative disenfranchisement rates are still high, and they tend to be so also for
people who have obtained a university degree. For example, a monolingual lan-
guage regime would (relatively) disenfranchise almost two-thirds of residents who
have achieved a tertiary level education. A high level of proﬁciency in foreign
languages in Europe is still not the norm, not even among the most educated
people. The relative disenfranchisement rate resulting from a full multilingual lan-
guage regime is not negligible in the groups of respondents who achieved a primary
or a lower secondary level of education. This can be explained by the fact that, on
average, non-EU citizens who have low levels of education tend to have low skills
in the dominant language of the host country.
Clearly, the socio-economic variables deﬁned in this article should not be con-
sidered in isolation. I estimate the statistical correlation between the level of edu-
cation achieved by respondents (deﬁned in six ordinal ranks) and their income
status (deﬁned in ten ordinal ranks). The correlation, measured by the
Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% signiﬁcance level in all countries reported in the ﬁrst column in Table 4. It
ranges from 0.16 in Denmark to 0.51 in Portugal. As expected, on average, resi-
dents who are less educated tend to belong to the lowest deciles of the income
distribution, and they are less likely to have good skills in foreign languages.
Table 5 also shows the distribution of the disenfranchisement rates according to
the main occupational status of respondents.9 Both Da and Dr tend to be unevenly
distributed across occupational statuses, with the partial exception of the hexalin-
gual and multilingual scenarios. Da is in general lower for respondents carrying out
a job than for unemployed and retired people, the permanently disabled and people
fulﬁlling domestic tasks (a variable correlated with gender). Foreign language
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skills, therefore, tend to be associated with a better employment status, which
is consistent with the literature showing a positive eﬀect of education and lan-
guage skills on income and employability (for an overview see Gazzola et al.,
2016). Diﬀerences among occupational statuses as regards the value of Dr are
weaker.
Discussion and conclusions
This article demonstrates that Europeans are still far from proﬁcient in one or just
a few foreign languages, thereby supporting skeptical views about the practicability
of reducing the number of the oﬃcial languages of the EU or restricting their
current domains of use. Empirical evidence does not support the claim that an
English-only or restricted multilingual language regimes (which I named trilingual
and hexalingual) would contribute to the eﬀectiveness of European communication
and to its inclusiveness. Rather, the results of this study tend to show that the
contrary is likely to be true, thereby conﬁrming the conclusions of other authors
(e.g. Backus et al., 2013; Barbier, 2015; Kraus, 2008). First, a full multilingual
language regime is still (and will be in the foreseeable future) the most eﬀective
language policy to convey information about the EU to people living in the Union
among the four alternatives analysed in this study. Second, knowledge of foreign
languages tends to be more common among residents belonging to the highest
deciles of the income distribution, those who have achieved a tertiary level of
education, and people currently employed (for a discussion on this see also
Gerhards, 2014). A drastic reduction of the oﬃcial languages of the EU, therefore,
would have regressive eﬀects, because it would be particularly detrimental to the
least educated people, those with the lowest income status, the unemployed, the
retired, the permanently disabled and residents fulﬁlling domestic tasks. Among
the alternatives considered, the hexalingual regime is clearly more eﬀective than the
monolingual and trilingual regimes, but it does not substantially reduce disparities
among social groups in countries in which English, French, German, Italian,
Spanish or Polish are not oﬃcial languages.
It is worth emphasising that it is not just a blanket reduction in the number of
languages that would be exclusionary. Even reducing the current domains of use of
the oﬃcial language entails analogous eﬀects. Hence, evidence supports the idea
that translation and interpreting currently contribute to creating a more inclusive
European public space by making it possible to implement a multilingual regime
based on the mother tongues or the primary language of education of the vast
majority of the residents in the EU (European Commission, 2010a). To conclude
on this point, the answer to the question posed in the title of this article (multilin-
gual communication for whom?), therefore, is: the majority of the residents in the
EU, and in particular the economically and socially disadvantaged individuals.
In order to assess the relevance of my ﬁndings, I discuss some common counter-
arguments, that is (i) few people actually need to have access to EU documents,
and those persons usually are proﬁcient in English; (ii) the costs of a multilingual
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language regime are unsustainable; (iii) the EU should adopt a long-term strategy
to promote a single lingua franca to minimise linguistic exclusion.
It can be argued that not all Europeans are interested in the business of the EU,
that just the elite actually needs to be informed about the process and the outcomes
of EU policy-making, and about EU legal texts. If it were true that, generally
speaking, ‘only elites are ﬂuent in more than one language’ (Kymlicka, 2001:
214, quoted in Rose, 2008: 460), then one could argue that full multilingualism
should be preserved in the European Parliament and in direct communication
between the EU institutions and EU citizens, whereas a certain degree of linguistic
disenfranchisement could be accepted in other circumstances (see Fidrmuc et al.,
2009). The evidence available, nevertheless, shows a diﬀerent picture. The AES
contains data on respondents’ type of occupation classiﬁed according to the
International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO-88). Ten macro-
occupation classes are deﬁned. The ﬁrst ISCO-88 class is named ‘managers’, and
it includes diﬀerent sub-speciﬁcations, i.e. ‘chief executives, senior oﬃcials and
legislators’, ‘administrative and commercial managers’, ‘production and specialised
managers’, ‘hospitality, retail and other services managers’. I focus on the ﬁrst sub-
class, that is, ‘chief executives, senior oﬃcials and legislators’ (N¼ 948, including
native speakers), because these people are generally considered to constitute part of
the European elite. The disenfranchisement rates in this sub-group of people are
estimated per each language regime alternative to the status quo. The results are the
following: Da¼ 27% and Dr¼ 77% (English-only policy); Da¼ 14% and Dr¼ 49%
(trilingual language regime); Da¼ 4% and a Dr¼ 17% (hexalingual language
regime). Compare these results with those presented in Table 1 for the entire popu-
lation. The results are somewhat surprising. First, as expected, the absolute disen-
franchisement rates among European chief executives, senior oﬃcials and
legislators are lower than the average disenfranchisement rates among the entire
population, but they are not low or negligible. Second, the relative disenfranchise-
ment rates are virtually equal in both groups, showing that managers do not have
much better skills in foreign languages than the average. Therefore, a signiﬁcant
percentage of European chief executives, senior oﬃcials and legislators beneﬁt from
multilingual communication.
Further, as noted above, EU external communication does not involve only the
production of legal or technical texts. Diﬀerent actors, including citizens who
receive a reply from the European Ombudsman, or youth organisations, schools
and NGOs that submit proposals for international educational projects, may need
to have access to programme guidelines, webpages and other oﬃcial documents.
This article shows that the majority of residents in the EU (and a large percentage
of managers) still has little or no competence in English as a foreign language, let
alone in French and German, and that those who declare to know foreign lan-
guages often speak them only at a fair or an intermediate level. Such levels may be
enough to take part in a conversation, to travel abroad and to perform speciﬁc
tasks in the workplace, but they are unlikely to be suﬃcient to participate in EU
business without too much eﬀort, or to compete on an equal footing with native
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speakers. Texts such as the EU directives, calls for tender, procurement procedures
are clearly demanding texts, but reading and understanding in a foreign language
information on food security, passenger’s rights, and the guidelines of EU funding
programmes can be challenging too. Debates held during the plenary meeting of
the EU Parliament or debates involving the candidates to the Presidency of the
European Commission (sometimes named ‘Spitzenkandidaten’) are public and
broadcasted via the Internet or on television. Such debates potentially concern
any EU citizen. Following and understanding them requires a very good level of
language competence. The tendency to underestimate the importance of the level of
linguistic skills in the public sphere can lead to awkward outcomes, even within EU
institutions. For example, on 5 February 2016 the European Parliament’s chief of
staﬀ, Mr Klaus Welle, urged MEPs to speak slower and stick to their native lan-
guage, to help the interpreters in doing their job (BBC, 2016). Some MEPs who are
not native speakers of English prefer to address their peers in this language because
they believe that this enables them to be better understood by a larger audience.
Yet, they overestimate their language competence, the interpreters fail to under-
stand what they say, and the message is not properly interpreted into other lan-
guages (on this point, see also Phillipson, 2003: 134).
A second counter-argument concerns the costs of the EU language policy. Some
authors claim that the language regime of the EU after the last enlargement has
become economically unsustainable (Cogo and Jenkins, 2010: 272). According to
the last oﬃcial ﬁgures available for 2012, the EU spends roughly E1.1 billion per
year on language services. This corresponds to a yearly expenditure of about E2.2
per resident, or E2.7 if I focus on residents who are at least 15 years old. It is not
likely that the enlargement to Croatia in 2013 brought about substantial changes.
E1.1 billion amounted to 0.0085% of the GDP of the EU in 2012, and 1% of the
budget of EU institutions and bodies. Something that costs 0.0085% of aggregate
income cannot be deﬁned as economically unsustainable. The real question is how
much Europeans are willing to pay for translation and interpreting services. Giving
an answer to this question is a purely subjective matter. Nevertheless, it is perhaps
useful to compare the European situation with the Canadian case, one of the few
countries for which data on the costs of oﬃcial bilingualism exist.
From April 2006 to March 2007 included (following the calendar of the typical
Canadian federal ﬁscal year), the costs borne by the Canadian federal government
to provide bilingual federal public services in the two oﬃcial languages (English
and French) – that is, oﬃcial documents and oral services, cultural services such as
TV and radio broadcasting, and the provision of criminal justice in both languages
(education, therefore, is excluded) – amounted to 1.6-1.8 billion Canadian dollars
($), of which $0.28 billion (roughly E0.2 billion) were spent for translation and
interpreting services (Vaillancourt and Coche, 2009: 28–32). $0.28 billion amount
to 0.02% of the Canadian GDP in 2006–2007 (or E3.6 per citizen per year).
Clearly, the EU and Canada are comparable only to a certain extent, because
the number of services provided by the Canadian federal government to its citizens
is larger than in the European case. Nevertheless, there are similarities between the
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two contexts. The EU must publish oﬃcial documents in diﬀerent languages too,
and it must provide multilingual legal procedures at the European Court of Justice.
Hence, if compared the costs of translation and interpreting in the EU as a per-
centage of the GDP or if compared with the Canadian case, the costs of European
multilingualism do not seem to be exaggerated.
Given the current distribution of language skills in the population, reducing
the direct costs of the EU language regime would essentially amount to shifting
the costs of non-multilingualism onto Europeans who do not know the oﬃcial
languages well enough, and in particular onto those who are less educated and
belong to the lowest deciles of the income distribution. To the best of my know-
ledge, it has never been convincingly demonstrated that reducing the number of
oﬃcial languages would cost less on aggregate than using a centralised translation
system. Rather, the contrary may be true, if the implicit costs of language policy are
duly taken into account. By implicit costs (or adoption costs), I mean the costs
borne by private citizens to adjust to language regime that does not include a
language they master, e.g. costs for private translations or the costs of learning
an oﬃcial language. If such costs are taken into account, the hexalingual and the
multilingual language regimes may turn out to be cheaper than the monolingual
and trilingual language regimes (see the online appendix for a tentative demonstra-
tion: http://eup.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/07/28/1465116516657672/suppl/
DC1). As Pool (1991) notes ‘it is wrong to claim (as is often done) that having
many oﬃcial languages is necessarily eﬃcient. As more native languages are
made oﬃcial, translation costs rise but adoption costs fall. If all adoption
prices are suﬃciently large, it will be eﬃcient to oﬃcialise all the groups’ native
languages. [. . .] The tendency to regard multiple oﬃcial languages as ineﬃcient
may, then, reﬂect a state-centred neglect of costs incurred by individuals in adapt-
ing to language policies’ (p. 503).
Another frequent counter-argument points out that disenfranchisement rates in the
long-term could be reduced by vigorous and massive language acquisition planning
aiming at spreading one common language, e.g. English (see for example De Swaan,
2001; Van Parijs, 2011). I do not discuss the desirability of this proposal from a nor-
mative point of view (on this point see, among others, Barbier, 2012; Grin, 2004;
Lacey, 2015; Phillipson, 2012; and several contributions in De Schutter and
Robichaud, 2015), and I do not address the thorny question of the role (if any) of a
common language in the creation of an EU identity (see Kraus, 2008; Romaine, 2013:
123–124 for a discussion). I limit myself to questioning the feasibility of this plan.
First, EU institutions cannot spread any speciﬁc language using education or the
media because the treaties give no competence to the EU in these policy areas in
accordance with the subsidiarity principle. The EU controls just one of the levers of
language policy (probably not the most important one), that is, the provision of
multilingual communication to European citizens and residents. The EU can inﬂu-
ence language learning and teaching through recommendations and funding pro-
grammes such as Erasmus+, but education policy ﬁrmly remains in the hands of
the Member States or even regional authorities (e.g. the German Bundesla¨nder).
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Each state or region has its own language policy that responds to local needs (e.g.
giving priority to the oﬃcial language of the neighbouring country).
Second, the eﬀectiveness of European education systems in teaching foreign
languages should not be overestimated. Results reported in this article and other
sources (e.g. Eurydice, 2012) reveal that younger generations learn foreign lan-
guages more often than in the past. This is certainly good news, but the average
level of competence achieved by pupils and students is still deceptive. For example,
English has been promoted as a ﬁrst foreign language in European schools for
decades, but the results are largely unsatisfactory. The First European Survey on
Language Competences (European Commission, 2012b) tested the competence in
diﬀerent foreign languages (mostly English and sometimes French) on a represen-
tative sample of 53,000 pupils in the last year of lower secondary education (or
ISCED2) or the second year of upper secondary education (or ISCED3) in several
European countries. The survey concluded that ‘language competences provided by
educational systems still need to be signiﬁcantly improved’ (European
Commission, 2012b: 5). Just a minority of pupils (28%) reach a level B2 of the
CEFR, which is usually the maximum grade of competence targeted at the ISCED3
level. Note that a B2 level can be considered to be the equivalent of ‘good’ (and not
‘proﬁcient’) in the scale used in the AES.
Third, the development of a bilingual education system through new teaching
methods such as content and language integrated learning (CLIL) and computer-
assisted language learning (CALL) (Scott and Beadle, 2014) requires considerable
investments in teacher training. Member States are not necessarily willing to give
priority to such investments, especially in Southern Europe where the public sector
is subject to ﬁscal austerity measures. For example, Law N 107/2015 in Italy
introduced CLIL into the public education system, but it speciﬁes that its imple-
mentation must take place ‘without draining further resources on public ﬁnances’
(Article 1.7).10
Finally, old education problems persist and new problems arise. Almost one-
fourth of 15 year olds are low performers in reading literacy in their mother tongue,
and this share has increased in recent years (European Commission, 2010b: 3).
Recent massive migration ﬂows could add complexity to the current situation,
because ‘students with a migrant background score systematically less well than
domestic students, notably because of insuﬃcient command of the language of
instruction’ (European Commission, 2008: 20). As diﬀerent young people in
Europe still experience some diﬃculty in reading in their mother tongue or in
developing good skills in the oﬃcial language of the host country, it is likely
that they would have even more serious problems in understanding complex
texts written (or uttered) in a foreign language.
Clearly, budget constraints at the EU level cannot be ignored, and no one
expects that every single document be translated into all oﬃcial languages.
Nevertheless, it is probably too early to dismiss EU translation and interpreting
services as a luxury good altogether. It is incumbent to policy-makers to evaluate
trade-oﬀs and make decisions. The article does not have particular normative
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implications (not primarily, at least). The analysis is meant to inform EU policy-
makers about the allocative and distributive eﬀects of EU language policy today
and in the foreseeable future, thereby helping them in making more informed
decisions. It is worth noting, however, that the disenfranchisement rate used in
this article is, admittedly, a rough indicator of potential participation in the
EU business, as it is based on a simplistic deﬁnition of communication as infor-
mation transfer. It is well known, indeed, that the value attached to languages
goes beyond its simple communicative value. There are also symbolic costs
resulting from depriving many Europeans of the opportunity to use their native
language within the EU. Such costs should not be neglected in LPP (Grin and
Vaillancourt, 1997).
A ﬁnal remark on the British withdrawal from the European Union is in order.
At the time of writing (June 2016) it is not possible to predict how the EU will look
like after Brexit. For a lack of better data, I compute the absolute and the relative
disenfranchisement rates as in Table 1, but excluding the UK from the set of
countries. The results show that Brexit is likely to increase the importance of a
multilingual approach in managing EU communication. In the 24 countries
examined, an English-only language policy would exclude 51% to 90% of adult
residents. A language regime based on English, French and German would disen-
franchise 30% to 56% of residents, whereas a regime based on six languages would
bring the shares of excluded population down to 9–22%. Compare these estimates
with results in the last row in Table 1: after Brexit, the rates of linguistic exclusion
associated with a monolingual policy, and with a trilingual and a hexalingual
regime are likely to increase.
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Notes
1. Regulation n1/58, regularly updated after every enlargement. For a detailed description
of the history of the EU language regime, its legal basis and its practical implementation
see Ammon (2015: 730–833), Gazzola (2006), Hanf et al. (2010: 81–162), Nißl (2011: 72–
127), and Van der Jeught (2015).
2. In the area of applied linguistics, see Ammon (2006, 2015: 730–833), Phillipson (2003),
and Romaine (2013); Tosi (2013) collects different articles from translation studies; in
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political science see, among others, Barbier (2015), De Swaan (2001), Ives (2004), Kraus
(2008) and Pool (1996). Finally, valuable contributions come from political philosophy
(Patten, 2007; Van Parijs, 2011).
3. In Romania, 58% of the sample did not answer questions on knowledge of foreign
languages. In the Netherlands, a large percentage of respondents did not answer to ques-
tions regarding the level of knowledge of foreign languages. The estimates of the relative
disenfranchisement rate for this country, therefore, are not reliable. Since this article deals
with aggregate observations for Europe as a whole, using only a partial sample for those
two countries would bias aggregate estimates.
4. No data exist on the level of proficiency for the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh
foreign language spoken by respondents (if any). Nevertheless, this is not likely to sub-
stantially bias Dr. The AES ranks respondents’ foreign languages according to the level
of proficiency in such languages. Thus, better spoken languages come first. It is quite
unlikely that a large percentage of respondents is equally ‘proficient’ in three or four
foreign languages in addition to their mother tongue(s).
5. No respondent declares to know Bulgarian as a first or second foreign language in
Bulgaria. This is not credible, because at least some non-native speakers of Bulgarian
living in Bulgaria must be proficient in this language. This might artificially inflate the
value of Da and Dr in this country.
6. In some countries, the distribution of statistical observations as regards the variable
‘income status’ is skewed towards the lowest deciles. In other countries it is skewed
towards the highest deciles. This should not be possible because, by definition, a decile
must contain 10% of the total number of statistical observations.
7. The Spearman’s correlation tests the correlation between ordinal monotonically related
variables, and it was chosen because unlike the Pearson’s correlation coefficient there is
no requirement for normality. Recall that  can take values from +1 (perfect positive
association of ranks) to 1 (perfect negative association of ranks).
8. The ‘primary’ level corresponds to 6% of the sample, the ‘lower secondary’ to 18%, the
‘upper secondary’ to 43% (usually this level corresponds to the end of compulsory
education), the ‘post-secondary non-tertiary’ to 4%, and the ‘tertiary’ to 28%. The
‘pre-primary’ level of education (0.8% of the sample) is ignored.
9. I focus on the following groups, formally defined in the AES as ‘people carrying out
a job or profession’, which includes unpaid work for a family business, holding an
apprenticeship or paid traineeship (69% of the sample), ‘unemployed’ (10%),
‘retired’ (8%), ‘permanently disabled’ (3%), and people ‘fulfilling domestic tasks’
(7%). Table 5 disregards other formally defined occupational statuses, that is,
‘pupils, students, people in training’, and respondents ‘involved in compulsory mili-
tary service’ as they represent a small percentage of the sample. In Hungary, the
answers ‘retired’, ‘permanently disabled’, people ‘fulfilling domestic tasks’, ‘pupils,
students, people in training’, and respondents ‘involved in compulsory military ser-
vice’ were merged into one single variable. Nevertheless, this does not affect the
reliability of our results.
10. As one of the reviewers of this article has noted, the EU could use funds from the
Cohesion Policy to support language learning. In particular, the so-called Objective 3
is dedicated to education, training and employment. This would be consistent with the
Council conclusions of 20May 2014 on multilingualism and the development of language
competences (OJ C 183, 14.6.2014, p. 26–29), and with the Council Resolution of
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21 November 2008 on a European strategy for multilingualism (OJ C320/1, 16/12/2008,
p. 1–3).
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